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Abstract 
In this paper my aim is to highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of a recent theory, called hybrid theory 
(Tendahl 2009) through the analysis of metaphors of the type X IS A JAIL. By providing sample analyses, my 
aim is thus to demonstrate, how different metaphors of the type X IS A JAIL can be described in a hybrid 
theoretical framework. My further aim is to show what possible solutions hybrid theory can provide for problems 
of conceptual metaphor theory and relevance theory, both serving as its sources. 
Keywords: conceptual metaphor theory, relevance theory, hybrid theory 
1 Setting the scene 
In this paper my aim is to highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of a recent theory, called 
hybrid theory (Tendahl 2009) through the analysis of metaphors of the type X IS A JAIL. 
Hybrid theory is an integrative model, combining the classical version of conceptual metaphor 
theory (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1993) and the theory of ad hoc concepts in relevance 
theory (RT) (Carston 1996, 2002, Wilson & Carston 2006, 2008). By providing sample 
analyses, my aim is thus to answer the following question: How far is Tendahl’s theory able 
to handle and possibly solve at least some of the problems considered to be the weaknesses of 
the two theories serving as its source? 
As a starting point I take the observation of Tendahl that one of the deficiencies of RT is 
that it cannot account for ‘emergent qualities’, i.e. what knowledge is activated while 
constructing the ad hoc meaning of metaphorical expressions such as  
 
(1)  It was a long and rough road. (describing a love relationship) 
 
to yield the superordinate category ROAD* meaning LOVE RELATIONSHIP
1
. Nothing in our 
knowledge about roads points to it being applicable to the duration of a relationship. Although 
the category of ROAD can be expanded to a significant extent, it will never have the property of 
durativity. However – Tendahl argues – if we presume that there is a predetermined relationship 
                                                 
*
  I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
1
  All mental contents, i.e. conceptual domains, conceptual regions, image schemas, conceptual metaphors are 
in capitals. Lexical concepts are in italicized capitals and ad hoc concepts are in italicized capitals with an 
asterisk. 
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between the domains of ROAD and LOVE in the mind, i.e. if conceptual metaphors exist, then 
there is a ground which can be drawn into the interpretation of metaphorical expressions. 
Therefore, it is clear that it is the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY with the help of which 
the ad hoc, contextual interpretation of ROAD* is possible. That is, Tendahl rejects the thesis 
of relevance theory according to which metaphors play an unimportant role in the 
interpretation process. Instead, he argues that relevance theory benefits from integrating the 
system of conceptual metaphors into the knowledge system that is assumed to be essential in 
the interpretation of utterances. The question, of course, is how it is possible to integrate 
conceptual metaphors into a relevance theoretical framework. 
On the other hand, while cognitive metaphor theories come up with significant results in 
spotting metaphorical systems, they fail to give an answer to the question relating to the 
mental processes that provide a basis for the way the mind applies these metaphorical systems 
in a given speech situation while processing a metaphorical phenomenon. Tendahl assumes 
that this deficiency of conceptual metaphor theory can be eliminated with the help of the 
mechanisms borrowed from relevance theory. Namely, relevance theory concentrates 
precisely on how given meanings are constructed in given speech situations. Therefore, the 
question that arises is, how ad hoc meaning construction processes from relevance theory can 
be integrated into a version of the conceptual metaphor theory. 
Tendahl’s theory can be treated as an integrative approach that seeks an answer to the 
complex question of how, on the one hand, mental phenomena, i.e. metaphor- and knowledge 
systems, and inferential schemes which are prerequisites for the mind to process a 
metaphorical expression, can be united in a single model and, on the other, how contextually 
relevant factors given in a discourse which definitely influence the mental processing of 
metaphorical expressions can be described. 
In the forthcoming sections, first the basic concepts of Tendahl’s theory will be introduced 
followed by the exemplification of the advantages of the model with the help of analysing 
metaphors of the type X IS A JAIL. Finally, I will highlight some critical points of the theory 
and further possibilities for research. 
2 The conceptual apparatus of Tendahl’s hybrid theory 
Tendahl’s hybrid theory is a combination of certain elements taken from cognitive metaphor 
research and relevance theory, the aim of which is to describe the processing of metaphorical 
phenomena in one model. In order to assess the workability of the theory correctly it must be 
made transparent what elements are combined with each other and how this happens, 
according to Tendahl’s ideas. 
2.1 Conceptual domain and mental spaces 
The cognitive architecture of the hybrid theory distinguishes conceptual domains and mental 
spaces. The two similarly sounding terms refer to two phenomena with very different status, 
although both originate from the conceptual apparatus of cognitive meaning construction. 
Conceptual domain is one of the key concepts introduced by conceptual metaphor theory and 
is defined by Croft and Cruse (Croft & Cruse 2004: 15). Conceptual domains are considered 
stable mental representations stored in long-term memory that contain information belonging 
to the same experiential domain organized in a system (Tendahl 2009: 198-199). Mental 
space is one of the basic concepts of blending theory (closely related to conceptual metaphor 
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theory) and unlike conceptual domains it is a cognitive space constructed in the process of on-
line meaning construction, in which the representations, i.e. meaning structures, have 
particular values based on the situation. 
In other words, while conceptual domains store context-independent information and are 
part of long-term memory, mental spaces are cognitive spaces where situational valid, i.e. 
context-dependent, information is processed and constructed (Tendahl 2009: 131). Another 
difference is that while conceptual domains typically contain information relating to one 
particular experiential domain (e.g. JOB, HEALTH, LOVE, JAIL), mental spaces may unite 
more than one conceptual domain at a time through the structures originating from these: My 
JOB* is a JAIL* (Tendahl 2009: 135). 
2.2 Lexical concepts and the reinterpretation of ad hoc concepts 
The cognitive architecture considered by Tendahl (2009) to be generally relevant is further 
differentiated below the level of conceptual domains. Taking the cognitive linguistic 
conception of conceptual domains as a starting point, he considers the domains as 
configurations of concepts. These informational units are identified by Tendahl as lexical 
concepts, and – since they are the building blocks of conceptual domains – he regards them as 
stable and context-independent informational units. The meaning created as a result of 
situational meaning construction he labels as ad hoc meaning following Carston’s notation. Its 
main source is, of course, the lexical concept, out of which an ad hoc meaning fitting the 
situation emerges as a result of the interplay of different factors. However, unlike Carston he 
denies that it would be possible even in principle for a lexical concept to appear in an utterance 
without any further modification: “every lexical item requires pragmatic modifications and is 
therefore understood in the form of an ad hoc concept” (Tendahl 2009: 195). According to 
Tendahl, every utterance eventually contains ad hoc concepts, thus in the hybrid theory we 
encounter a more radical notion of ad hoc concepts than in Carston’s conception.2 
Let us consider the following example. We have received a letter from an aunt at whose 
house we spent many summer holidays. 
 
(2)  November has passed. The leaves in the park have already fallen from the trees. 
 
The lexical concept LEAF associated with the word leaf supposedly contains the linguistic 
information that retains the morphological and phonological properties of the word. These 
properties are basically context-independent, or at least are context-sensitive only to a minimal 
extent. In the same way, what role the concept LEAF can assume in a sentence is also context-
independent. Nevertheless, in the present context our world knowledge pertaining to leaves is 
also part of the lexical concept. A leaf, as part of a plant, has its own biological morphology 
(stem, leafstalk, veins etc.), its own size and pattern and is presumably green. Such a leaf does 
not occur in nature, of course, since it is not specified to which plant it belongs. These essential 
features comprising the lexical concept LEAF are subjected to an adjustment process in a given 
context, the point of which is that the essential features of the lexical concept assume the 
concrete meaning fitting the context, i.e. the ad hoc concept LEAF* emerges. 
                                                 
2
  Recently Carston has also modified her views on ad hoc concepts, but still argues that contexts are possible 
where the lexically encoded meaning is sufficient. See Carston (2010: 159, especially fn. 4 citing the 
literature on the question). 
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In our case the context-independent concept LEAF is shifted in a certain direction, namely 
in the direction of the leaf of a tree, more precisely to that of a fallen leaf of a tree (LEAF*). 
This leaf has already some sort of shape, size and it – since it is autumn – will not be green, 
but rust-colored. The hearer arrives at the ad hoc meaning of the word leaf as a result of the 
interplay of the following factors: the expectations of the hearer motivated by the context and 
the section of his encyclopedic knowledge about the world that is relevant in the context; it is 
also part of this knowledge that the speaker’s behaviour makes it obvious that the utterances 
at hand are relevant for him. 
The production of ad hoc concepts is a fast, automatic and unconscious inferential process, 
though it can be made conscious. According to the hybrid theory, there has to be a mental 
structure that facilitates this process. In other words, a structure that opens up lexical concepts 
to stimuli from the context, and – vice versa – a structure that is responsible for ensuring that 
the stimuli from the context affect the context-independent information stored in the lexical 
concept in a pre-channeled and synchronized way so that the ad hoc concept fitting the 
discourse can evolve. Tendahl calls this mental structure the conceptual region, and by this he 
practically extends the relevance theoretic conception of lexical concepts. 
2.3 Conceptual region and free slots 
The notion of conceptual region is a central category of the hybrid theory and it is defined by 
Tendahl as follows: 
A conceptual region is a context-independent unit related to a particular word. Therefore, conceptual 
regions are accessed and ad hoc concepts are constructed on the basis of conceptual regions. Thus, 
conceptual regions are the structures which constitute lexical semantics. However, in a particular 
discourse situation we automatically and directly create a contextually modulated version of a conceptual 
region, i.e. an ad hoc concept (italics added – P. Cs.). This process is studied in cognitive pragmatics. The 
conceptual region provides us with some lexical information plus procedural information about how to 
create the ad hoc concept. In that sense, conceptual regions are blueprints for ad hoc concepts. (Tendahl 
2009: 200) 
 
 
Figure 1: Tendahl (2009: 203) 
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Thus, the notion of conceptual region includes – beyond the basic features of the lexical 
concept – those pieces of information which are already available in relation to how ad hoc 
concepts can be constructed from lexical concepts that are at the core of the conceptual 
region. These informational “spots” function as free slots within the region, providing access 
to other external knowledge structures via a connector element in order to be able to establish 
a connection with another conceptual region. 
The words in an utterance (more precisely the conceptual region activated by them and 
their role in the clause structure) play the role of the stimuli that activate knowledge structures 
functioning as connectors. A connector may connect to a free slot because there is a 
previously given connection of some kind between the conceptual region and the external 
knowledge structure containing the connector (for example a conceptual metaphor). These are 
labeled by Tendahl ‘entrenched free slots’.3 
 
(3) Ruude is a tree. (Tendahl 2009: 212) 
 
This utterance is used by a speaker in a conversation about football players to characterize the 
striker’s advantages. It means Ruude is a tall player with excellent heading skills. The word 
tree in (3) is used in a metaphorical sense. In Tendahl’s analysis, it is this word in utterance 
(3) that serves as a connector element. It points to a free slot of the conceptual region TREE 
and has the function of establishing a connection with PEOPLE ARE PLANTS within the 
domain of conceptual metaphors. This free slot is entrenched, because X is a tree exemplifies 
a conventional metaphorical structure. It is this knowledge about conventional metaphors that 
exerts contextual pressure on the activation of the conceptual region TREE and contributes to 
the construction of the metaphorical ad hoc concept TREE*. 
It has to be stressed that the knowledge structures appearing in the free slots are not part of 
the lexically coded conceptual meaning and, though they are not part of the conceptual region 
either, the connection may, in some cases, (for instance, in the case of collocations) be very 
strong. According to Tendahl, these knowledge structures comprise image schemata, 
conceptual metaphors and conceptual metonymies, knowledge structures that are stored in the 
long-term memory. 
In summary it can be stated that ad hoc concepts are constructed so that on the one hand 
the conceptual region is activated by the context, which simply means that an element of the 
utterance exerts sufficient cognitive pressure on the hearer to activate a conceptual region. On 
the other hand, due to the underdetermination of the activated conceptual region the aim of 
the interpretation is that the free slots of the conceptual region should be filled by the 
interference of some kind of external knowledge structure in a manner relevant to achieving 
the intended effect. As a result of this conceptual modulation, an ad hoc concept emerges that 
is modified with respect to its features and which fits the context but at the same time still 
keeps the source activated so that it can be traced back (Tendahl 2009: 201). 
In the following I try to show how a metaphorical mapping comes about in this model and 
how conceptual metaphors can participate in the construction of ad hoc meanings fitting the 
context. 
                                                 
3
  But it may well be the case that the free slot of the conceptual region is not entrenched at all. In this case we 
can talk about an ‘ad hoc free slot’ (Tendahl 2009: 195) and it will be the context that entirely defines what 
enters the free slot of the conceptual region, i.e. which sources of information are used as a base for 
constructing the ad hoc conceptual meaning. 
  
Péter Csatár: X IS A JAIL 
Argumentum 10 (2014), 248-260 
Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó 
253 
3 Analyses: Love is a jail. 
Let us consider first the following example: 
 
(4)  Love is a jail. 
 
Our starting point is the connection between two conceptual regions in an utterance whose 
formal structure is a nominal predicate. From a semantic point of view, both expressions 
activate two separate conceptual regions whose cores are each constituted by a lexical 
concept. These concepts have context-independent semantic properties that serve as the basis 
enabling the ad hoc meaning in the utterance to fit together. Let us first consider the concepts 
and their elements, and then how the interpretation which we assign to the utterance emerges, 
i.e. that love is a state one cannot get out of without further struggle. 
The lexical concept of LOVE would be very difficult to define exhaustively, but this 
definition is not necessary in Tendahl’s model. It is sufficient to posit a minimal definition in 
order to start the analysis. We assume that the lexical meaning constituting the core of the 
conceptual region LOVE contains the following basic features with certainty: it is typically an 
emotional state of a person in which a strong – spiritual and bodily – attraction (desire, 
affection) towards, and idealization of, another person manifest themselves. The lexical 
concept of JAIL can be described as follows: it is typically a confined space where people stay 
for a certain amount of time against their own will.
4
 
By connecting the two conceptual regions in the utterance, they become each other’s 
mutual linguistic context whose structure is determined by the clause structure (subject + 
predicate). Hence the clause structure imposes a constraint such that a free slot of the 
activated conceptual region LOVE has to be filled by one or more elements of the conceptual 
region JAIL as a connector. If there is no element that can function as a connector, the 
processing of the utterance will be void of sense for the hearer from a cognitive point of view. 
Let us consider the following example: 
 
(5)  Love is a swimming cap. 
 
If, during the processing of this utterance, the hearer wants to relate the conceptual regions of 
LOVE and SWIMMING CAP to each other, presumably he or she has to make a serious 
effort from a cognitive point of view, since they cannot – or only with difficulty – find an 
element that they can fit into one of the free slots of the conceptual region LOVE from the 
conceptual region SWIMMING CAP. 
In the case of Love is a jail we need to posit the question of what it is that ensures that an 
element of JAIL can function as a connector in the construction of the ad hoc meaning of 
LOVE*. Tendahl assumes that in order to construct the ad hoc meaning, it must be ensured 
that the conceptual regions JAIL and LOVE be related to each other. The possibility of this 
                                                 
4
  It is easy to see that we do not need the concept of JAIL in order to describe a very general, underdetermined 
concept of LOVE. This is important to point out, since according to the traditional version of conceptual 
metaphor theory the concepts of emotions, for instance, can only be understood metaphorically, i.e. the mind is 
dependent on conceptual metaphors when it represents the concept of LOVE. Though Tendahl does not touch 
upon it, one important consequence of his theory is that it enables us to make the distinction between how we 
talk about love (with the help of ad hoc concepts) and how the mind represents the concept of LOVE (with the 
help of conceptual regions). In addition it does not exclude the assumption that with the help of conceptual 
metaphors we can facilitate and specify what we intend to say, and – vice versa – by the same token 
conceptual metaphors stored in our long-term memory can be of help in processing metaphoric expressions. 
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connection is provided by conceptual metaphors which are stored in the long-term memory. 
The question arises what kind of connection obtains between the system of conceptual 
metaphors and the different conceptual regions. 
However, it is a considerable difference in relation to traditional conceptual metaphor 
theory that Tendahl does not assume conceptual metaphors whose content is finely elaborated, 
but, by accepting Grady’s distinction between primary and compound metaphors (Grady 
1997) he starts out from the assumption that it is primary metaphors that function as 
connector elements and bring about the metaphorical ad hoc meaning by connecting the two 
conceptual regions. At the same time, since traditional conceptual metaphor theory is not 
concerned with the emergence of metaphorical ad hoc meanings, Tendahl considers the 
mental spaces of blending theory to be the terminological apparatus which helps to describe 
on-line metaphorical meaning construction.
5
 
According to the assumption of the hybrid theory, in the metaphor Love is a jail, the 
primary metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS has the role of the connector 
which henceforth connects the regions of JAIL and LOVE. The conceptual metaphor 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS is thus neither part of the lexical concept of 
JAIL nor that of LOVE, but is an external knowledge structure that is, however, very easily 
accessible during the use of these lexical concepts, since we find among the basic features of 
JAIL that it is a PLACE and among the basic semantic features of LOVE that it is a STATE. 
And if we activate both, the conceptual metaphor capable of connecting them will be naturally 
activated too. If this relationship occurs repeatedly and with sufficient frequency, it gets 
stored in long term memory in the form of a conventionalized metaphor. 
Before we address the question of what advantages this procedural model may have, let us 
take a look at two readings of another example. 
 
(6) ‘Szabadságra megyek’– szokták mondani az emberek, amikor egy ideig nem mennek be 
a munkahelyükre. Különös dolgot sugall ez: mintha a munkahely börtön lenne. Pedig a 
munkának, amelyet a felnőtt végez, jó esetben nem kellene tehernek lennie, inkább olyan 
foglalatosságnak, amely örömet is okoz. (Tóth & Valaczka: 110)6 
 
In this example, too, it is the connector STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS that 
links the two conceptual regions. Among the basic features of the lexical concept belonging to 
the conceptual region JOB we find a strong connection of different conceptual domains via 
connector elements: the place (WORKPLACE) where people (WORKER) work (WORK), that 
is, where they MAKE MONEY, and where they SPEND a certain amount of TIME. However, 
we need to take into account the fact that here we do not encounter a STATE, as we do in the 
case of LOVE, because STATE is not a basic feature of the lexical concept JOB. Therefore, we 
can assume that, in this case, the relationship between the conceptual region of JOB and the 
                                                 
5
  For the theory of primary and compound metaphors see especially Grady (1997) and Lakoff & Johnson 
(1999: 57-58). Grady proposed that most fundamental image schematic metaphors, such as ACTIONS ARE 
MOVEMENTS, REASONS ARE PHYSICAL FORCES, HAPPINESS IS UP, SEEING IS GRASPING, GOALS ARE 
DESTINATIONS etc., should be treated separately, since these metaphorical schemata are universal, and 
presumably compound conceptual metaphors are also based on them. Primary conceptual metaphors are 
universal, since they reflect elementary experiences that can be traced back to the biological and physical 
conditions of the human species. Compound metaphors are built upon these primary metaphorical schemata. 
Such a compound metaphor would be LOVE IS A JOURNEY. 
6
  English translation: ‘I'm going on holiday [lit. I’m going on liberty/freedom] – people often say, when they 
do not attend their workplace for a while. This implies a strange notion: as if a workplace were a jail. But 
ideally, the job done by an adult should not be a burden, but an activity that also pleases one.’ 
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conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS is not as tight and direct as 
in the case of LOVE. But, there is an indirect connection between JOB and JAIL. The 
conceptual region JOB is naturally connected to the conceptual domain of WORK, too, since 
one of its central features is WORKPLACE, i.e. the place where work has to be done by a 
person (WORKER). The lexical concept WORKER is also part of the domain WORK, one of 
whose basic features is that workers have some kind of EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP with 
their workplace. This relationship can be either positive or negative. In the case of the 
metaphor MY WORKPLACE IS A JAIL, the negative attitude is elaborated by the conceptual 
metaphor FREEDOM OF ACTION IS FREEDOM OF MOTION: the work activity is mostly 
connected to a specific location, and the employees cannot leave their workplace at any time. 
In order for us to be able to describe one’s mental attitude as being in a certain place, we use 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS as a basis. At the same time, it is a second, 
different metaphor that specifies whether this attitude is a negative or a positive one. 
It is as a result of the contextual pressure that the word workplace appears in a 
metaphorical construction whose structure is X IS A JAIL, i.e. it is a location. Since we 
assume – even if we are not aware of it – that the speaker intends to convey relevant 
information, the process of interpretation does not break down because it would be rather 
meaningless to state that a location is nothing else than another location (except if we are 
comparing physical places). The mind, in order to achieve the greatest cognitive effect 
possible (with the least effort) looks for the closest and most satisfying interpretation, which 
will be that the worker conceives of work as a burden, and the workplace as a treadmill. 
 
(7) I get along with my colleagues, the atmosphere is calm, and there are no surprises. We 
work fixed ours, the twelve-hour-shifts are exhausting sometimes, but at least no one 
loses his job here. My boss is a warden who keeps an eye on everybody and everything. 
We don’t have many problems with the inmates. My workplace is a jail, but I don’t feel 
bad about it, and I do not need to keep it secret from my friends. (my constructed 
example – P.Cs.) 
 
This example can demonstrate that here, as a result of contextual pressure, an interpretation 
comes about that requires only a minimal modification of the lexical concept: based on the 
lexical concept WORKPLACE the ad hoc concept WORKPLACE* (with the meaning the 
place where I work) eventually emerges, and jail gives a minimal description of this place: the 
place where inmates are kept. 
If we take a look at example (8) out of context, then both readings – the metaphorical and 
the literal – can be simultaneously active: 
 
(8)  My workplace is a jail. 
 
The simultaneous presence of both readings is possible because, according to the model, the 
metaphorical reading is one of the primary readings. More specifically, although the 
conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS is not part of the lexical 
concepts WORKPLACE and JAIL, both conceptual regions contain certain free slots which 
automatically give rise to conceptual metaphors. The use of the relevant conceptual metaphors 
is restricted just in case the state is interpreted as a physical location (i.e. a correctional 
institution). If there is no contextual pressure favouring any of the readings, both readings will 
be active. (The same does not hold, however, of the metaphor LOVE IS A JAIL.) 
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4 Advantages of the hybrid theory 
In order to interpret metaphorical expressions, the hybrid theory relies on relevance theory, as 
it adopts the minimalist concept of meaning, the principles of ad hoc expressions, the 
principle of optimal relevance,
7
 and borrows various terminological items including 
“conceptual region”, “conceptual modulation”, and “pressure of context”. Furthermore, the 
hybrid theory utilizes conceptual domains and conceptual metaphors from conceptual 
metaphor theory, more precisely from the theory of primary and compound metaphors 
developed by Grady (Grady 1997). 
4.1 The on-line model of metaphorical expressions 
Tendahl’s theory deserves credit for modeling the on-line processing, i.e. the construction and 
comprehension of metaphors. A further remarkable achievement is that in this theory the 
status of conceptual metaphors is much more clarified as in the classical version of conceptual 
metaphor theory. Tendahl considers conceptual metaphors as external knowledge structures 
which do not belong to conceptual regions, or more precisely, to our lexical concepts that 
constitute the core of these conceptual regions and function as storage tools of our knowledge. 
4.2 Conceptual metaphors as procedural and as declarative knowledge 
Although Tendahl assumes that conceptual metaphors are a distinct area in the mind, he does 
not undertake to differentiate between primary and compound metaphors. In my opinion, in 
the hybrid theory one encounters the distinction between “knowing that” and “knowing how”, 
which was introduced by Gilbert Ryle (1949/2009) in analytical philosophy. While “knowing 
that” is equivalent to declarative knowledge, i.e. something that can be put into exact words 
and involves lexical knowledge, “knowing how” cannot be easily explained in words. Most of 
us can ride a bike but we would hardly manage to explain how to do it in a subtle form and to 
impart these skills purely as lexical knowledge. 
In Tendahl’s theory, conceptual metaphors are forms of knowledge which can be 
connected to conceptual regions in the process of meaning construction. But the domain of 
conceptual metaphors is not so homogenous as Tendahl assumes. The primary metaphor 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS is a procedural metaphor, that is, it connects a 
conceptual region (LOVE) and a conceptual region (JAIL). As a result, LOVE IS A JAIL is no 
more a primary but a compound metaphor, and it can be treated as a knowledge structure that 
is different from primary metaphors. It is not a kind of procedural knowledge that serves as a 
the basis for the connection between different mental content, but the result of a metaphorical 
mental operation and it is stored in the mind as a kind of knowledge about the connection of 
concepts in the form of a compound metaphor. 
4.3 The systematic nature of conceptual metaphors 
Tendahl (2009) also refers to the fact that the systematic nature of conceptual metaphors 
requires that they should be considered as independent knowledge structures. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that certain conceptual metaphors that refer to the same conceptual 
domain, (LOVE can be JOURNEY, WAR, or BUSINESS) have to be coherent with each 
                                                 
7
 Cf. Sperber & Wilson (2012) 
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other. When constructing ad hoc concepts, it will be the context that finally determines which 
conceptual metaphor should connect a certain conceptual domain that is based on the lexical 
concept of LOVE. 
4.4 Extension of data sources 
Compared to traditional conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff 1993), a further advantage of the 
hybrid theory is that its data sources are not restricted to linguistic data, since this theory also 
relies on psycholinguistic experiments (Gibbs & Tendahl 2006). In the light of these findings, 
the assumption that conceptual metaphors represent independent knowledge structures seems 
to be provable, given that in the course of on-line meaning construction the mind needs the 
same amount of time to process metaphorical and non-metaphorical expressions.
8
 
4.5  Responses to the criticism of conceptual metaphor theory 
Despite the fact that the Invariance Hypothesis in Lakoff’s theory has been widely criticized 
(Grady, Morgan & Taub 1996, Murphy 1996), Tendahl considers this principle to be 
provable. The Invariance Hypothesis states that during the metaphorical mapping the 
cognitive topology of the source domain, to be precise its structure, is preserved in the target 
domain. According to the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE can be 
conceptualized as a JOURNEY because the mind creates systematic correspondences between 
these two conceptual domains by mapping the inner structure of the source domain onto the 
target domain. 
Criticism of the Invariance Hypothesis has mainly focused on the issue of how various 
conceptual metaphors are able to structure the target domain at the same time, provided that 
the inner structure of the target domain is already structured by other conceptual metaphors 
(e.g. LOVE can be WAR, BUSINESS or HUNGER). This phenomenon – when there are 
several source domains and only one target domain – poses a problem because all further 
metaphorical mappings should necessarily be coherent with the metaphorical, cognitive 
topology that has been previously structured by other conceptual metaphors. Consequently, 
these projections are not coherent with each other.  
In response to this criticism the present theory claims that these projections need not be 
coherent at all; thus, the Invariance Hypothesis only states that in the process of mapping the 
structure of a certain source domain is preserved in the target domain. Hence, various 
conceptual metaphors concentrate on a single aspect of the target domain and consequently 
have to be compatible not with each other, but at the most with the already existing image 
schematic structure of the target domain. Moreover, it can also happen that the source domain 
overrules the basic structure of the target domain. Even in this case it is not the Invariance 
Hypothesis that is violated but the structure of the target domain which undergoes certain 
changes. In such cases it is again the principle of relevance that determines whether these 
changes are effective in a given communicative situation. Examples such as This is actually 
the old theory, just in a new cloak or just repainted prove that when expressing something 
unusual, i.e. that the theory is actually is not new, it is just attempting to appear so, we rather 
opt for using non-conventional metaphorical expressions that do not pertain to physical 
buildings. It is once again the principle of relevance that helps us to explain a phenomenon 
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 Cf. http://mixingmemory.blogspot.hu/2004/09/lakoffs-view-of-metaphors.html   
This article provides a brief and easy-to-read summary of the critical aspects of Lakoff’s classical theory.  
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which traditional conceptual metaphor theory cannot because it concentrates on structural 
correspondences and not on meaning constructions.
9
 
Traditional conceptual metaphor theory cannot explain why a systematic mapping is not 
coherent and why certain elements are not transferred to the target domain. The theory seems 
not to impose any restrictions in this respect. For instance, several elements are mapped onto 
the target domain from the conceptual metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS: 
 
(9)  We have to construct a new theory. (Kövecses 2002: 30, 83-84) 
 
However, buildings have windows, doors, cellars and attics etc. No references to these parts 
can be tracked, which could be explained by their incompatibility with the inner structure of 
the target domain as this structure is actually determined by buildings. Tendahl argues that the 
Invariance Hypothesis basically refers to what structures have to be transferred and not to 
what content elements can be transferred to the target domain. In consequence, Tendahl uses 
the Invariance Hypothesis in a stricter sense than Lakoff and states that the question of which 
elements are transferred from the source domain to the target domain is a contextual one. 
Thus, in some cases we could say that This part of the theory is the theory’s panic room. In 
this case, the speaker determines in a given communicative situation if transfer and 
elaboration of a particular element is relevant or not. In other words, in this respect it is RT 
that backs CMT, as it is the principle of relevance that restricts which elements are elaborated 
in the process of the meaning construction of a metaphorical expression. 
4.6 Integration of imagistic qualities into the theory 
Relevance theory cannot really account for metaphors such as Oliver is a bulldozer because 
when constructing the ad hoc concept of a bulldozer, a kind of visuality emerges besides the 
characteristic features (Carston 2002: 356, quoted by Tendahl 2009: 145). Nevertheless, this 
cannot be conveyed in the form of propositional information. Therefore Tendahl considers 
that we should explore how such visual information can also be integrated (Tendahl 2009: 
145-148). 
4.7 The question of metaphorical motivation 
In connection with the very same example Tendahl also points out that relevance theory 
cannot explain why it is particularly physical features which underlie psychological ones. In 
the example Oliver is a bulldozer, there are underlying physical features: strength, which is 
associated with the figure, psychological feature of strength, as well as relentlessness in a 
physical sense and relentlessness in a psychological sense. Cognitivist theories would claim that 
this derives from the conceptual metaphor PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES ARE PHYSICAL 
FORCES. Such primary metaphors hold a special position in Tendahl’s theory; however, this 
example shows that a hybrid model could handle questions that relevance theory fails to. 
                                                 
9
  Cf. Tendahl (2009: 121) 
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4.8 Advocating the continuity hypothesis 
Tendahl accepts the relevance theoretical assumption regarding the homogeneous processing 
of meaning, i.e. there are no differences between literal and metaphorical meanings, since for 
the types and modes of the processing of meaning: “literal expressions, conventional and 
novel metaphors, category crossing and category modification metaphors all work similarly” 
(Tendahl 2009: 246). The hybrid theory is a model which does not have to assume 
metaphorical mapping as a separate mechanism in the on-line construction of meaning. 
Nevertheless, it states that due to frequent usage, relationships between the conceptual 
domains are generated automatically and these relationships are stored in knowledge 
structures of compound conceptual metaphors and the contextual pressure makes the mind 
activate these relationships. 
5 Concluding remarks 
Relying on Tendahl’s hybrid theory, which sets out from the compatibility of relevance theory 
and conceptual metaphor theory, the following conclusions can be drawn in connection with 
the two questions, stated at the very beginning of this paper. 
The system of conceptual metaphors is integrated in the hybrid model as procedural and 
declarative knowledge. One type of conceptual metaphors, i.e. primary metaphors can 
function as connector elements between conceptual regions and external conceptual domains. 
On the other hand, compound metaphors can function as external knowledge structures, 
although their status is not clarified in every detail. Are they distinct conceptual domains of 
metaphorical origin or are they simple labels for connected conceptual regions and conceptual 
domains, or probably both? 
The other question concerning the integrability of the assumptions of conceptual metaphor 
theory and relevance theory is a metatheoretical one. Conceptual metaphor theory is based on 
a genuine holistic theory of the mind, whereas relevance theory has a massive modular 
conception. Whether the contradiction between these two conceptions of the mind can or 
cannot be resolved is a very difficult question. However, this question can be answered by a 
theoretical reconstruction carried out in a metatheoretical conceptual framework, which is an 
aim not pursued here.
10
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